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1. INTRODUCTION 
This Essay examines the contours of what I have elsewhere 
called the new constitutional order! with re~ect to international 
human rights and federalism. The background is my suggestion that 
the U.S. political-constitutional system is on the verge of moving 
into a new constitutional regime, following the end of the New 
Deal-Great Society constitutional regime.2 The Supreme Court's 
innovations in the law of federalism in connection with Congress's 
exercise of its powers over domestic affairs has provoked 
tCarmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. B.A., 1967, Harvard University; M.A., 1971, Yale 
University, J.D., 1971, Yale University Law School. I would like to thank L. 
Michael Seidman, Peter Spiro, and Carlos Manuel Vazquez for their comments 
on a draft of this Essay, and Jacqueline Shapiro for her usual top-notch work as 
a research assistant. 
1. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the 
Chastening of Constitutional A mbition, 113 HARv.1. REV. 29 (1999). 
2. For a discussion of the idea of constitutional regimes, and for a brief 
description of the New Deal-Great Society regime, see Tushnet, supra note 1, at 
34-36. A shorthand description of the concept of constitutional regimes is that 
they are reasonably stable sets of political and constitutional arrangements within 
which political actors determine policy based on their shared understanding of 
the regune's fundamental organizing principles. 
841 
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speculation about the implications of those innovations for the 
national government's power with respect to foreign affairs.3 Most 
of the speculation has been that the Court is about to-or at least 
should-en~age in what I have called projects of restoration and 
revolution. That is, the Court will, or should, return to an 
understanding of the relation between the nation's power with 
respect to foreign affairs that prevailed before the New Deal-Great 
Society era. 
According to the conventional understanding of the New Deal-
Great Society order, the national government had essentially 
plenary power over an:r matter fairly described as implicating the 
nation's foreign affairs. Congress rarely pressed the limits of this 
plenary power during the New DeaI-Great Society era,6 but 
political actors agreed that Congress had broad power. That 
agreement may have conditioned the policy-making environment 
by making available for serious consideration proposals that would 
involve expansive exercises of power, thereby pushing policy-
bargaining in an internationalist direction. Thus, acknowledging 
linuts on Congress's constitutional authority with re~pect to 
foreign affairs would not only change dramatically our 
understanding of what Congress might do, but might also have real 
effects on polIcy outcomes. 
I propose in this Essay a more modest perspective on the 
relation between the Court's new federalism doctrine and the 
constitutional regulation of the nation's conduct of foreign affairs. 
Focusing on international human rights, I argue that the Court's 
initiatives are likely to be rather small. This chastened ambition, as 
I have called it, results in part from the structure of politics in the 
current regime, but more from the accumulated weight of 
precedent and, even more, from the continuing importance of U.S. 
3. Probably the most prominent such speculation is Curtis A. Bradley, The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REv. 390 (1998) (ar~ing, 
inter alia, that the Court's doctrine dealing with foreign affairs shoUld De 
harmonized with its new domestic federaIism doctrine). For additional 
discussion, see infra notes 76-100 and accompanying text. 
4. Mark Tushnet, What is the Supreme Court's New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REv. 927 (2000). 
5. Another part of the conventional understanding was that within the 
national government the President had essentially plenary power with respect to 
such matters, even in the face of congressional disagreement. This aspect of the 
New Deal-Great Society constitutional order is not a focus of my concern here. 
6. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (a 
case in which Congress did not exercise its power over foreign commerce to 
displace a controversial state tax). This contrasts with its actions in domestic 
matters, where it did exercise its powers quite expansively. 
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government action in the international order. Section I! of this 
essay outlines the place of forei~ affairs in the New Deal-Great 
Society constitutional order, and the reasons for thinking that they 
will occupy a somewhat different place in the new constitutional 
order. Section ill describes some problems where international 
human rights and domestic constitutional law intersect. Section IV 
then examines the Supreme Court's federalism doctrine and its 
application to foreigtl. affairs generally and to the problems 
described in the preceding Part. 
I!. FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS 
Harold Koh has described processes by which international 
legal norms are incorporated into the domestic legal order? I adapt 
his term to describe the incorporation of international poltcy 
concerns as well.8 After such concerns are incorporated and 
internalized in the policy-making process, they must be integrated 
with the remainder of constitutional law. The conventional 
wisdom about the way in which foreign affairs were integrated into 
the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order can be easily 
stated. The United States came to playa major role in international 
affairs, initially in W orId War I! and then as the leader of anti-
communist forces during the Cold War.9 A bipartisan consensus 
emerged supporting that role as traditionally isolationist segments 
of both major parties were displaced. The consensus was that the 
new U.S. role required maximum flexibility in developing 
international policies.10 The nation's power with respect to foreign 
affairs therefore had to be plenary.11 As Martin Flaherty puts it, the 
7. See Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home, 35 Hous. L. 
REv. 623, 642 (1998) (describing, inter alia, political and legal "internalization" 
of international norms). 
8. For additional discussion of legal internalization, see text accompanying 
notes-infra. 
9. For a discussion, see W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational 
Code of Competence, 83 AM.J.lNT'LL. ro, 780-83 (1989). 
10. For a discussion of the manner in which constitutional doctrine was 
transformed, stressing that the process took place over along period and was not 
directly connected to the New Deal itself, see G. EDWARD WHITE, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 33-93 (2000). 
11. Responding in part to Senator Bricker's proposals to amend the 
Constitution, the consensus came to accept the proposition that this plenary 
power was limited by the Constitution's individUal rights provisions. See Reid 
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). For a discussion of the Bncker proposals, see 
DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF 
EISENHOWER'S POUTICAL LEADERSffiP (1988). 
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New Deal, W orId War II, and "the emergence of the Soviet Union 
led to a rejection of formalist nineteentli-century understandings, 
fostering instead a regime that was executive-centered in terms of 
separation of powers, nationalist as a matter of federalism, and 
internationalist in general orientation. "12 Formalist doctrines, in 
which some matters might be categorically excluded from the 
foreign affairs power, were replaced by balancing tests that gave the 
government what seemed to be the appropriate degree of 
flexibility .13 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, "parochial doctrines 
reemerged. Domestically, 'states' rights' is no 10nRer a 
segregationist slogan but once again constitutional doctrine." 4 The 
declining threat of international crisis removed one source of 
nationalIzing pressure. IS In Jack Goldsmith's terms, at least some of 
the internatIonal issues currently raisin~ questions of domestic 
constitutional law "are from any perspectIve much less significant" 
than the ones arising from the Cold War.16 One of Goldsmith's 
examples is the Massachusetts law under which the state refused to 
contract with businesses that themselves did business in Myanmar 
(Burma) .17 That he uses such an example is symptomatic of another 
feature of the modem constitutional order - the decay of consensus 
on what matters in international affairs. Supporters of the claim 
that international human rights matter a great deal have significant 
political leverage within the Democratic party, and rather less in 
the Republican party .. Similarly, the parties seem to disagree 
12. Martin S. Flaherty, History Right? Historical Scholarship, Original 
Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REv. 
2095, 2095-96 (1999). 
13. See Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign 
Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1395, 1409 (1999) (asserting that "[t]he 
Court's traditional rule-like approach to the judicial foreign relations doctrines 
might have seemed unsatisfactory because any errors of under- or over-
inclusiveness were thought to be unacceptably costly in the Cold War world"). 
14. Flaherty. supra note 12, at 2096. 
15. See Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REv. 1089, 1105 (1999) ("The end ofthe Cold War era also is a'likely 
factor in the shift away from foreIgn affairs exceptionalism, since there is now 
a reduced need for the national government to speak with one voice in 
international relations, and because many of the exceptionalism decisions . . . 
clearly seem to be a product of the Cold War era."). See also Peter J. Spiro, 
Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1223, 1241-46 (1999) 
(describing the historical Cold War context in which foreign affairs doctrine was 
shaped). 
16. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1412. 
17. See id. The Massachusetts law was held preempted by federal legislation 
in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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systematically about the appropriate role in U.S. foreign policy of 
a generalized concern for human rights. IS 
In addition to these political elements, the institutional 
environment of modem intemationallaw differs in several ways 
from the institutional environment associated with the foreign 
affairs policy-making process during the New Deal-Great Society 
constitutional order. The participants in intemationallaw-making 
differ. Traditional intemationallaw involved the direct creation of 
binding rules in bilateral or multilateral treaties, while modem 
international law establishes free-standing law-making institutions 
to generate norms.19 Domestically, the process of participating in 
international law-making differs as well. Historically, wnat mi~ht 
be called ordinary interest groups, typically oriented to achiev10g 
material goals, were the major interest group participants in the 
domestic processes that fed into treaty-maKing.20 Now non-
governmental organizations with ideological coIlltn.ltments, interest 
groups, to be sure, but of a different sort, are important participants 
10 die process, and some of these organizations operate across 
national borders. 
These new features of the constitutional order suggest that the 
contours of constitutional doctrine might change as well. The 
Massachusetts Burma Law case may provlde a hint of such changes. 
One doctrine associated with the New Deal-Great Society: order 
was a strong presumption that the national power over foreign 
affairs preempted state legislation, even when Congress had not 10 
fact directly exercised its power and even when the state legislation 
was not obviously incompatible with what Congress had in fact 
done.21 The Supreme Court might have decided the Burma Law 
18. For example, the 2000 Democratic National Platform, available at 
< http://www.democrats.org/hq/ resources/platformlplatform.html> Qast 
visited Mar. 1, 2001), "demand[s]" that "Congress pass the Convention to 
Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women," and asserts that "[ w ]e 
will continue to press for human rights, tlie rule of law, and political freedom." 
The 2000 Republican platform, available at 
< http://www.rnc.orgI2000/2000platform8 > Qast visited Mar. 1, 2001), 
criticlzes the Clinton aOministration's humanitarian interventions and mentions 
human rights in connection with Cuba, Chechnya, and Iran. 
19. For a collection of essays on Traditional and Contemporary 
International Law, see INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY 
READINGS (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998). 
20. Here I have in mind the interest groups associated with the negotiation 
of tax treaties and in litigation over the constltutionality of state taxes affecting 
corporations operating transnationally. 
21. The strongest case supponingthis presumption is Zschernig v. Miller, 389 
U.S. 429 (1968). 
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case by invoking this presumption. It did not. Instead, it adopted 
what appears to be a studiously neutral stance, applying ordinary 
principles of statutory interpretation with no concession in its 
lDterpretive aIWroacli to the fact that the state law implicated 
foreign affairs. 
A political scientist might think that the Court's neutral 
aRproach resulted in part from some relatively novel characteristics 
of the Burma Law. State efforts to influence other nations' 
governments through their purchasing activities are a rather recent 
development. Perhaps more important, the Burma Law was the 
product of a new policy-making process, in which transnational 
non-governmental organizations have come to act in the way 
traditional interest groups did.23 These transnational NGOs differ 
from most traditional interest groups. Typically, the latter have 
some direct material interest in the legislation they seek,24 while 
transnational N GOs typically assert only moral interests.25 Perhaps 
the New Deal-Great Society presumption in favor of preemption 
made sense to a Court accustomed to assessing legislation emerging 
from a policy-making process dominated by the traditional interest 
groups that were an integral part of that order. The new 
constitutional order might be SKeptical about that process and 
adopt a state-favoring !'resumption against preemption. But, the 
new policy-making enVIronment may have left the Court in a more 
neutral interpretive position. 
Accordiri~ to Koh, international norms become sources of 
domestic law, 6 but, as I have indicated, they are only one among 
22. For my analysis of the case, see Mark Tushnet, Globalization and 
Federalism in a Post Printz World, 36 TULSA L.J. 11 (2000). I should note, 
however, that other scholars believe that what the Court did was actually 
inconsistent with its avowedly neutral interpretive stance. I believe that those 
scholars have not yet made their case, largely because to do so would require 
comparing the Court's performance in the BurmaLaw case with its performance 
in other preemption cases not involving foreign affairs, a task that these scholars 
have not yet undertaken. 
23. But see Koh, supra note 7, at 647 (describing the role of transnational 
NGOs in the antislavery movement of the 1800s). 
24. Of course they may also have moral interests, and almost always press 
their policies on public interest grounds. Nonetheless, the element of material 
interest is so common as to be a structural feature of traditional interest group 
lobbying. 
25. Again, this is not to contend that transnational NGOs do not have, or 
at least are not supported by groups that have, material interests Qabor unions 
supporting international human nghts claims about working conditions being 
the obvious example), but only that the place of material interest is substantially 
smaller than in tr3.ditional interest groups. 
26. See Koh, supra note 7. 
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many such sources. They must be integrated into domestic 
constitutional law, harmonized with other doctrines. The New 
Deal-Great Society constitutional order harmonized foreign affairs 
to other J:!rovisions by giving foreign affairs primacy.27 Ordinarily-
foreign affairs policies miglit express the United States' nationcil 
interest narrowly understood. Sometimes, however, those policies 
would adopt international norms. Even then the New Deal-Great 
Society constitutional order gave them primacy. The new 
constitutional order may treat international norms as on roughly 
the same plane as other sources of law. 28 The project of integration 
would then become more complex. The next Section describes a 
few areas in which U.S. constitutional law will have to engage in 
that project. 
ffi. FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
The project of integrating international legal norms and 
domestic constitutional law may be a large one once domestic 
constitutional law is not automatically subordinated to 
international norms.29 On some interpretations, the North 
27. Critics refer, somewhat pejoratively I think, to "foreign affairs 
exceptionalism." See, e.g., Bradley, sUp!a note 15, at 1104. Peter Spiro pointed out 
to me that the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order gave primacy to 
foreign affairs primarily, if not exclusively, with respect to policy concerns 
rather than constitutional ones. 
28. See Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1399, uses the term "unders(>ecification" 
to refer to the problems tnat arise when a norm. must be integrated lOto existing 
law, without clear guidance from the norm itself as to its place in domestic law. 
Goldsmith continues, "[E]ven if federal law is underspecified [that is, when 
integration is necessary] ..• , such controversy is no more serious than analogous 
controversies that arise all the time from underspecification of federal law in 
domestic contexts." Id. 
29. I must express the discomfort I felt as a domestic constitutionalla'\YYer 
reading arguments about the incotp:>ration and integration of international legal 
norms into domestic constitutional law. The predominant view appears to be 
that the analytic work is completed upon establishin~ that some particular norm 
is in fact a norm of international. law, sometImes on tlie ~ound that 
international legal norms by definition override contr~ domestIC ones. That 
would be true as well if the domestic processes by whIch international legal 
norms were integrated into domestic law made them hierarchically superior to 
other sources of domestic law. Such superiority may have (contlO~ently) 
characterized the New Deal-Great Society constitutional order. But, plalOly, it 
is not a necessary characteristic of the relation between international norms and 
constitutional law , including the constitutional law of federalism. It may be that 
the international legal norm prevails because it can be integrated into domestic 
constitutional law without alteration, but today establishing that proposition 
takes some arguments drawn from domestic constitutional law. 
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American Free Trade Agreement authorizes determination of 
binding domestic law by an appellate body whose members do not 
have die guarantees of tenure required by Article llI.30 Some have 
contendea that the treaty banmng the production of biological 
wea~ns authorizes searches within the United States that do not 
satis the Fourth Amendment's reguirements.31 
wo episodes involving the deadi penalty offer the opportunity 
to examine the integration of international human riglits norms 
with the domestic constitutional law of federalism. The first is the 
celebrated Breard litigation.32 Breard was a national of Paraguay 
who was convicted In a Virginia court of capital murder and 
sentenced to death.33 The Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations provides that foreign citizens detained by officials in 
another nation must be informed promptly of their right to contact 
their embassy. 34 Breard did not receive that information.35 After his 
conviction Breard filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal court, 
arguing that the failure to comply with the Vienna Convention's 
requirements entitled him to relief from his conviction.36 In 
addition, Paraguay filed suit in the federal district court and in the 
Supreme Court against various Virginia officials, seeking an 
injunction against the execution.37 And, finally, Paraguay filed an 
action against the United States in the International Court of 
Justice, which promptly issued an order directing the United States 
to ~take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco 
Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these 
30. For contrasting views, see Demetrios G. Metropoulos, Constitutional 
Dimensions o/the NorthAmericanFree Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELLINT'LL.J. 
141 {1994} (arguing that the NAFTA dis~ute resolution violates Article Ill), and 
Justin Senior, Comment, The Constituttonality of NAFTA's Dispute Resolution 
Process, 9 FLA. J .INT'L L. 209 (1994) (arguing that the dispute resolution process 
is constitutional). See also A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts andAmerican 
Courts, 21 MICHJ.lNT'LL. 877, 892-900 (2000) (discussing Article ill Eroblems 
that might arise from a treaty authorizing international review of decisions by 
U.S. courts). 
31. See, e.g., Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Problems with Enforcing the 
Biological Weapons Convention, 61 CATO INST. FOREIGNPOL'yBRIEFING 1,3·8 
(Sept. 28, 2000). 
32. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). Weisburd, supra note 30, at 
879 no.7-8, provides citations to the major academtc commentaries on the Breard 
litigation. 
33. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 373. 
34. Seeid 
35. See id 
36. See id 
37. See id 
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proceedings. "38 
All the suits failed. Breard's habeas corpus suit was rejected 
because he had failed to present his claim under the Vienna 
Convention to the state courts in an appropriate manner.39 
Pa~y:'s suits failed because a foreign nation IS not a "person" 
entitled by the relevant federal statute to sue state officials for 
constitutional violations,.fO because the Convention did not clearly 
provide a private right of action in which a nation could vacate a 
conviction,41 and perhaps because the Eleventh Amendment barred 
suits against the state officials.42 Responding to the International 
Court of Justice's order of provisional measures, the U.S. Secretary 
of State wrote a letter requesting that Virginia's governor delay 
Breard's execution.43 The u.S. Department of Justice took the 
position in its briefs to the Supreme Court that such a request was 
the only "measure at its disposal" under u.S. constitutionallaw.# 
The u.s. Supreme Court, after citing that letter, concluded, "H the 
Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his 
prerogative. But nothing in our existing case law allows us to make 
that choice for him. "45 
Virginia was also involved in the other case on which I focus. 
Jens Soering and his girlfriend conspired to kill her parents.46 He 
fled to Europe.47 Responding to a request for extradition, Soering 
obtained a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights that 
Virginia'S method of administering the death penalty was "cruel, 
inhuman, [or] degrading treatment" in violation of the Euro1?ean 
Convention on Human Rights,48 with the result that the BrItish 
government could not comply with both the extradition request 
38.Id. at 374 (~oting Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, 1998I.C.J. Reports 248 (Apr. 9,1998), from Concerning the Vienna 
Convention of Consular Relations (paraguay v. U.S.), 1998 I.e.]. Pleadings 91 
(Oct. 9, 1998}). 
39. See U1. at 375. 
40. See id. at 378. 
41. See id. at 377. 
42. Seeid. 
43. See id. at 378. 
44. As the government brief put it, "our federal system imposes limits on the 
federal government's ability to interfere with the criminal justice systems of the 
States. The 'measures at [the United States'] disposal' under our Constitution 
ma}" in some cases include only persuasion." Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 51, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214). 
45. Breard, 523 U.S. at 378. 
46. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 439 (1989). 
47. Seeid. 
48. 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), pp. 439, 478, P111 (1989). 
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and the European Convention. The u.s. sovernment then 
represented to the United Kingdom that Soermg would not be 
prosecuted for capital murder in Virgip.ia.49 Soering was then 
extradited and was prosecuted without facing the risk of capital 
punishment. 50 
Breard and Soering raise questions about the integration of 
international human rights norms and u.s. federalism. In 
panicular, the cases implicate the two dimensions of the new 
constitutional order's federalism doctrine.51 The first dimension is 
a restriction on the subject-matter scope of congressional power; the 
second is a restriction on the methods Congress may use to carry 
out policies otherwise authorized by the Constitution. The Court 
has operated along the first dimension in invalidating the Gun-Free 
School Zones Act,52 the civil1iabi1i~ provisions of the Violence 
Against Women Act,53 and the ReligIOUS Freedom Restoration 
Act.54 In each case the Court held that the Constitution allows 
Congress to act only when it can properly invoke one of the 
powers enumerated m the C~>nstitution, and that the power to 
regulate commerce among the several states or to implement the 
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive guarantees did not extend to 
the statutes in question.55 The Court has operated along the second 
dimension in defining the "anti-commandeering" principle, 
according to which Congress may not direct state legislative 
officials to enact or state executive officials to enforce legislation 
conforming to Congress's specifications.56 
49. For a description of the U.S. government's representations, see Sanja 
Djajic, The Effect of International Court of justice Decisions on Municipal Courts In 
the United States: Breard v. Greene, 23 HAsTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 27, 79-
80 (1999). 
50. The U.S. Supreme Court has regu!arly denied review of claims that long-
term detention on death row awaiting execution violates the Eighth 
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. For the most recent case, 
see Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999), with separate opinions by Justices 
Thomas and Breyer. 
51. A third set of cases involving federalism limits the remedies available for 
violations of substantive norms otherwise properly imEosed on the states. These 
are the so-called Eleventh Amendment cases. Notably, these cases do not 
implicate the substantive scope of the national government's power, which is my 
concern here. 
52. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
53. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000). 
54. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
55. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 567-68; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607, 618-19; City 
of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
56. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925-26 (1997); New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992). See also infra note 99. 
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Breard and Soering indicate the ways in which a national 
obligation assumed unCler a treaty may have adverse effects on a 
state's ability to prosecute ordinary crime, an interest that the 
Court has occasionally invoked in e~laining its subject-matter 
limitations on congressional power.5 In addition, the Vienna 
Convention a,llpears to impose an obligation on state police officials 
to comply With a directIve from die national government, an 
obligation that is in apparent tension with the anti-commandeering 
principle.58 
Tlie Breard litigation was rushed, and reached the Supreme 
Court in an extremely awkward procedural posture.59 In addition, 
Breard's argument that Virginia's failure to comply with the 
Vienna Convention entitled liim to relief from his conviction may 
well have been flawed on the merits.60 More interesting than 
Breard's personal claims are possible responses to the ICl's Order 
of ProvisIOnal Measures.61 Tlie ICI ordered the U.S. government to 
"take all measures at its disposal. "62 What measures were at the 
national government's disposal? In particular, could the U.S. 
government direct that VirgInia forgo its prosecution because of the 
state's failure to comply with die Convention? To focus the 
discussion, suppose that Con~ess enacted a statute implementing 
the Convention with two basiC elements. First, Congress directs all 
state police officials to ask the persons who they arrest whether 
they are forei~ nationals and then to inform immediately those 
who are, of tlieir rights under the Vienna Convention.63 Second, 
57. See, e~g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 927-28 (describing the diversion of 
investigative efforts from felony cases to background checKs). 
58. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963 (1970),21 
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42. 
60. The Convention could be read to provide a right to notice but not that 
the remedy for violating that right is the invalidity of any conviction later 
obtained. 
61. Order on Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.]. 
Reports 248 (Apr. 9, 1998) from Concerning the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations (paraguayv. United States), 1998I.C.J. Pleadings 91 (Oct. 9, 
1998). 
62. Order of Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.J. Reports at 258. 
63. After the Breard litigation concluded, the U.S. government apologized 
to the government of Paraguay and distributed information about die Vienna 
Convention's requirement to police agencies throughout the country-. For the 
former, see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, Breard v. Greene, 
523 U.S. 371 (1998) (No. 97-8214); for the latter, see Marion Nash, Contemporary 
Practiceo/the U.S. Relating to International Law, 92 AM.J.lNT'LL. 243, 243-45 
(1998) (quotin,g Consular Notification andAccess: Instruction for Federal, State, and 
LocafLaw EnJorcementand Other Officials Regarding Foreign Nationals in the U.S. 
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Congress provides that no person entitled to such information can 
be prosecuted if the information was not given, and that 
convictions obtained when the information was not given are void. 
Would such a statute be constitutional? Similarly, one can ask 
where the national government gets the authority to represent to 
foreign nations that state governments will not invoke their 
ordiriary criminal processes, including the option of the death 
penalty.64 
IV. FEDERALISM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE 
NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
A. A Framework for Evaluating the Need for Constitutional Doctrine 
Much existing discussion of u.S. federalism and international 
human rights proceeds by hypothesizing that the United States has 
entered into some internatIOnal agreement that requires national 
and the Rights of Consular Officials to Assist Them, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. 
No. 10518 (1998». 
64. The doctrine of speciality permits post-extradition limitations on the 
power to prosecute. Most reported specialty cases appear to involve limitations 
on the power of the U.S. government to prosecute after extradition, but state 
courts assume that they must enforce limitations pursuant to representations by 
the u.S. government. See, e.g., Washington v. Pang, 940 P.2d 1293 (Wash. 1997) 
(addressing the :proper interpretation 01 the doctrine of specialty while assuming 
its applicability). I note as well that it seems to be assumed that the doctrine 
applies to liiriitations on post-extradition punishment, or at least to 
representations that the death penalty will not be invoked. Additionally, a 
federal statute provides: "Whenever any person is delivered by any foreign 
government to an agent of the United States, for the purpose of being brou~t 
within the United States and tried for any offense of whIch he is duly accused, 
the President shall have power to take all necessary measures .... for [the 
accused person's] security against lawless violence." 18 U.S.C. § 3192 {1994}. 
Although the context clearly suggests a concern for protecting against mob 
violence, the term "lawless violence" might reasonably fie interpreted to refer to 
a state government's refusal to comply with the doctrine of specialty. Carlos 
Vazquez, Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, suggested 
to me that the extradition of a particular individual after a representation by the 
United States that triggers the doctrine of specialty might be regarded as an 
executive agreement made pursuant to the overarching extradition treaty, and as 
an executive agreement, it would bar states from acting in a manner inconsistent 
with the agreement under United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and 
United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942). Finally, the doctrine of specialty is 
available as a defense to a criminal prosecution, and is therefore applied by state 
courts. According to the Supreme Court, the anti-commandeering principle does 
not bar the national government from imposin~.obligations on state judges. See 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178·79 (distinguishing Testa v. Katt, 330 
U.S. 386 (1947». 
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action that intrudes on matters of state concern, whether by taking 
over a subject-matter ordinari!y regulated by state governments or 
by commandeering state officials. For example, authors ask 
whether the U.S. Constitution would preclude the nation from 
entering into an international agreement to ban the imposition of 
death sentences on those who were juveniles when they committed 
their crimes. But, proceeding by hypothetical may be particularly 
misleading today, in the new constitutional order because such 
agreements are exceedingly: unlikely to be adopted. 
I begin with what should be obvious: Over the past generation 
the treaty-makers have been quite reluctant to endorse eXEansive 
exercises of the treaty power. They have routinely aaded a 
"federalism" declaration to international agreements dealing with 
human rights, and sometimes have expressly disclaimed the 
applicabili~ of particular treaty j>rovisions.65 If anything, this 
practice is likely to strengthen in the new constitutional order. 
The political ori~s of these "federalism" limitations are 
reasonably clear. The basic features of the national governing 
process over the past generation have been divided government and 
Increasingly hostile divisions between the Democratic and 
Republican parties. Acceding to the international agreements in 
question has been a priority of the human rights and 
internationalist wings of the Democratic party.66 They picked up 
65. For a recent discussion and defense of the practice of making federalism 
and more specific reservations to U.S. ratification of international treaties, see 
Curtis A. Bradley &Jack 1. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional 
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399 (2000). On a techniCal level, federalism 
declarations mi~ht not preclude Congress from enacting constitutionally 
questionable legtslation and may not be judicially enforceable. But, more 
important, the federalism declarations tYEically state that the national 
~overnment will implement the treaty to which the declaration is attached only 
m areas of traditional national auihori9!. Thus, on a political level, the 
government could defend any treaty-based legislation on the ground that it did 
not go beyond the sco~e of traditional national authority. Nonetheless, a Senate 
insistent enough on federalism to require that a federalism declaration be 
attached to a treaty is unlikely to approve treaty-based legislation raising 
federalism concerns. 
66. For example, the Carter administration submitted five international 
human rights agreements to the Senate (the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political Ri~tsD, the 
International Covenant on Economic. Social. and Cultural Rights, the 
Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 
the American Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDA W)); the 
Reagan administration submitted two (the Genocide Convention and the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
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some support from the residual internationalist wing of the 
Republican party, but Republicans have been significantly more 
skeptical of international institutions than Democrats. Treaties 
require agreement from two-thirds of the Senate, a level that cannot 
be reached without substantial bipartisan support in a Senate that 
has become increasingly divided along partisan lines even on 
foreign affairs issues. The federalism declarations are the price 
Democrats have to ~ay to obtain enough votes from Republicans 
to adopt the treaties. 7 Even sharper divisions are present in the new 
constitutional order, making it quite unlikely that the United States 
will enter into treaties or international agreements raising serious 
federalism questions.68 
New, problematic agreements may be rare. But what of existing 
agreements? Some agreements made during the New Deal-Great 
Society constitutional order might raise questions that were not 
taken seriously at the time they were entered, but would be taken 
seriously in the new constitutional order.69 This could occur in two 
ways. First, the existing agreements might be interpreted 
expansively. The Supreme Court's actions in the Breard litigation 
suggest that the Court is unlikely to provide such interpretations. 
Its opinion was shot through with skepticism about the claim that 
the Vienna Convention should be interpreted to provide any of the 
many grounds for relief Paraguay and Breard found in the 
Convention.7° Nor is it likely tliat today's Congress would seize 
uRon an existin~ treaty as the basis for legislation it could not 
otherwise enact. 1 Second, the existing agreements might be 
Treatment or Punishment [hereinafter Torture Convention]; the Bush 
administration submitted two (the Torture Convention and the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights); the Clinton administration submitted two (CERD 
andCEDAW). 
67. The same dynamic occurs in connection with ordinary legislation, where 
the requirement of support in both houses of Congress replaces the requirement 
of two-thirds support m the Senate. 
68. Treaty proponents may be able to move some treaties forward by 
gaining agreement from some states to accept the treaty's requirements and 
agreement from the negotiating I>artners that application of the treaty's 
requirements everywhere in the United States is unnecessary. (I am grateful to 
my colleague John Jackson for pointing out this possibility to me). 
69. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 75 (distinguishing between the Supreme 
Court's willingness to aggressively review old statutes and Congress' reluctance 
to enact new ones). 
70. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 377-78 (1998). 
71. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimension of RFRA, 14 CONST. 
COMMENT. 33,50-51 (1997) (suggesting that the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights might be a source of con&ressional authority to enact the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA». For the Congressional response to the 
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unambigt!ous.72 The Vienna Convention, for example, really does 
command state police officials to take particular actions; the 
ambiguities the Court found in the Convention went to remedy, 
not to the underlying obligation?3 As we will see, however, the 
unambiguous agreements raising serious federalism question have 
a rather strong pedigree. The Court could enforce federalism 
limitations only oy engaging in a revolutionary transformation of 
constitutional doctrine. But it need not do so. The existing 
agreements that unambiguously raise federalism questions are, I 
believe, rather few in number and these exceptional cases can be 
preserved without threatening any serious federalism concerns the 
Court might have in the new constitutional order.74 
In the new constitutional order, then, the Supreme Court is not 
likely to have any need to develop constitutioncil doctrines dealing 
with power to regulate international affairs that limit national 
power in the name of federalism. Modesty, not revolution, is the 
order of the day. 
B. Federalism Limitations on the Power Over Foreign Affairs 
Applying subject-matter limitations and the anti-
commanaeering principle in the context of international relations 
is likely to prove quite difficult. A subject-matter limitation 
Supreme Court's invalidation of the RFRA, relyin& on the commerce and 
spending powers, see Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 
2000, PuD. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803. 
72. Again, coming to the matter as an outsider, I was struck by the existence 
of interyretive ambi~ty with respect to the doctrine of specialty in Soering, 
both WIth respect to Its application to state-level prosecutions and with respect 
to representations about the ap,t>lication of the oeath ,t>enalty. If interpretive 
ambisuity exists there, unambIguous provisions raismg serious federalism 
questions must be exceedingly rare. 
73. See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376. 
74. Carlos V~uez has pointed out that many existing treaties have 
aspirational I?rovisions that, while not enforceable without supporting 
legislation, mtght be invoked to justify legislation not otherwise within an 
enumerated power. See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty 
Power, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 1317, 1339 n.75 {1999}. He also points out that the 
trea~ that was the basis for upholding the statute in question in Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920), provided that the United States would propose 
appropriate legislation, not tIlat it would enact such legislation. Vazquez suggests 
iliat Holland might be limited by denying Congress the power to enact statutes 
based on such precatory provisions. I wonder, liowever, whether this makes too 
much of the difference between an obligation assumed by the national 
government to propose legislation and an ooligation to enact it: Why would a 
treaty partner accept the former without believing that it entailed the latter? 
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appropriate to the context of international relations would have to 
accommodate two concerns: the national interest in conducting 
international affairs, and federalism. The Court's federalism 
doctrine provides only hints at what such an accommodation might 
look like. Those hints suggest that the accommodation might place 
. in doubt national actions that go back to the early Republic. 
Applying the anti-commandeering principle to international affairs 
woUld have similar effects. The Court has supported the anti-
commandeering principle by pointing out that Congress has only 
recentlrs attempted to direct state officials to enforce national 
policy. 5 That argument seems unavailable with respect to national 
power over international affairs. Finally, the Court's articulation 
of the anti-commandeering principle aIlows a number of escape 
hatches, some of which are rather clearly applicable to the Breard 
and Soering litigation. 
1. Subject-Matter Limitations 
The Court has confronted the issue of subject-matter limitations 
in connection with two discrete grants of power to Congress, the 
Commerce Clause and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The doctrine emerging from the Commerce Clause opinions is that 
Congress has power to regulate commercial activities that, in the 
aggregate, have a substantial. effect on interstate commerce, but may 
not refIlate non-commercial activities having the same aggregate 
effect. The Court's rationale for the rustinction between 
commercial and non-commercial activities is that some line must be 
drawn to ensure that the commerce power does not give Congress 
plen!uy authority to regulate whatever a majority decides to 
regulate,77 and that the language of the Commerce Clause supports 
drawing the line between commercial and non-commercial 
activities.78 The Section Five decisions hold that Congress may 
enact legislation enforcing the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's first section to the extent that the legislation is a 
proportionate response to demonstrated violations of those 
75. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 917-18 ~997). 
76. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000 . 
77. See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denmn~, ower Court Readings 
of Lopez, or What If the Supreme Court Held a Constztutional Revolution aiid 
NobotJy Came?, 2000 WIS. L. REv. 369, 378 (2000), describing this as the "non-
inftnity principle," that "anr justification for congressional power must not be 
one that would undermine the very notion of enumerated powers." 
78. See Board of Trustees ofthe Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 
(2001); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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~tees.79 
These rules are of course tied to the particular constitutional 
provisions at issue. The Commerce Clause opinions, however, have 
another theme. The Court explained the importance of interpreting 
constitutional provisions as placing limits on Congress's Eowers by 
emphasizing that more expansive interpretations would license 
Congress to act in areas traditionally re~lated primarily by the 
state. Those areas include education, ordfuary crone, and land use 
control. 80 This suggests that the Court ml~ht be interested in 
develo'pin~ a suoject-matter limitation directed not at the 
ConstitutIOn's enumerations of power, but rather at what used to 
be called the reserved powers of state governments. 
These two approaches to subject-matter limitations will be 
difficult to develop in the context of Congress's power in 
international affairs. One problem is that the Court's federalism 
decisions have been concerned with what it characterized as 
innovative exercises of congressional power. For example, it used 
the fact that Con~ess had only recently begun to commandeer state 
executive officials in support of the anti-commandeering rule.81 But, 
treaties in which the u.s. government agreed to legal rules that, 
according to contemEoraneous understandin~s, It could not 
otherwise enact go back to the early Republic. Even more, the 
Constitution unambiguously gives Congress the power to "define 
and punish ... Offences against the Law of Nations,,,83 some of 
which might be the subject of ordinary state criminal law . Professor 
David Golove notes early treaties overriding state laws barring 
aliens from owning real property, which might fall within the 
present Court's area of "land use regulation," despite the fact that 
79. See cases cited supra note 78. 
80. On education, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (criticizing 
the implication of alternative views that woUld allow Congress to "mandate a 
federal curriculum for local elemen~ and secondary schools"); on ordinary 
crime, see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (noting that alternative views would allow 
Congress to regulate murder); on land use control, see Solid Waste Agency v. 
Army Corps of Engineers, 121 S. Ct. 675, 684 (2001) (referring to the states' 
"traditional and primary power over land and water use"). 
81. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 917-18. 
82. See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Forei~ Affairs: Congress' Power to 
"Define and Punish . .. Offenses Against the Law oJ Nattons," 42 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 447 (2000). 
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 10. See generally David M. Golove, Treaty-
Making and the Nation: The Historical Foutiilations of the Nationalist Conception 
of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1075, 1149-1210 (2000) (describing treaties 
entered into during the early Republic and ante bellum periods, as well as 
contemporaneous political and academic commentary). 
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no one at the time thought that Congress had a general power, 
independent of its trea~-making power, to prescribe rules of real 
property law applica6le in the states.84 Professor A. Mark 
Welsburd, describmg treaties upheld by the Supreme Court that 
overrode state laws regulating inheritance of lands by aliens, 
suggests that "regulation of ... those subjects would even today be 
difficult to bring within the powers of Congress described in 
Article I of the Constitution."8 
What shal?e might a doctrine limiting the Treaty Power take?8& 
One might tnmk tliat just as regulation premised on the Commerce 
Clause must target truly commercial activities, so regulation 
premised on the Treaty Power or other international affairs powers 
must target subjects trUly appropriate for international agreement.87 
The problem with this suggestion is that it is quite aifficult to 
identity subject that are not appropriate for international 
agreement. 
The difficulty comes in two forms. First, in a globalized world 
the line between domestic matters and international ones is 
increasingly difficult to draw-far more difficult than drawing the 
84. See Golove, supra note 83, at 1157-88 (describing the controversy over 
the Jay TreaD' between the United States and Great Britain, which contained a 
provision allowing British subjects to own real property in the states, thus 
overriding the common law rule allowing forfeiture of real property owned by 
aliens). I note that the federal courts followed state common law on real 
l'rope!"tY even during the era of Swift v. Tyson. See, e.g. , Jackson v. Chew, 25 U.S. 
(12 Wheat.) 153 (1827). 
85. Weisburd, supra note 30, at 900 {discussing Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 
Wheat.) 259 (1817), and Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879». 
86. The suggestion that federalism llinitations are conceptuaBy inappropriate 
with respect to forei~ affairs rattles around in the literature. Relying on United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), these autliors suggest 
that power over foreign iffairs was never lodged in the states, which therefore 
could not "reserve" any aspect of foreign affairs power from the Constitution's 
delegations to the national government. See, e.g., Chad Thornberry, Comment, 
Fediralism vs. Foreign Affairs: How the United States Can Administer Article 36 of 
the Vtenna Convention on Consular Relations Within the States, 31 MCGEORGE 
L. REv. 107, 139 (1999); Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good 
Law? Federalism and the Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1726, 1748-50 (1998). 
The argument could be supplemented by observing that the Court adopted a 
related view in U.S. Term Ltmits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). But, as one 
author observes, "One objection to this position is that it ... leaves the treaty 
power virtually unlimited. " Healy, supra, at 1750. If accepted, it would terminate 
the inquiry in which I am engaged here. In addition, adopting the position would 
be an aggressive assertion of national authority, in an era when the doctrinal 
trend is in the other direction. 
87. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 140-41 
(1972) (describing cases supporting such a limitation). 
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line between commercial and non-commercial activities.88 As 
Pro~essor .Ta~k G<?ldsmith puts it, the difficulty of identifying u.s. 
foreIgn relatIons mterests 
is exacerbated by the waning of the distinction between 
domestic and foreign affairs. . . . In truth there is no 
definitive way of diVining the U.S. foreign relations interest 
in a particular context or the manner in which this interest 
would be best accommodated. The Constitution gives these 
tasks l'rimarily to the political branches that have the 
expertIse and structure to perform them relatively well.89 
Second, and probably more important, determining what is a 
matter for international agreement IS not a unilateral deCISion made 
by the United States; it is a bilateral or multilateral one made in 
negotiations with other nations not necessarily concerned about 
U.S. domestic arrangements. So, for example, U.S. negotiators 
could come to the taole with proposals that, m u.s. constItutional 
terms, might deal solely with matters that are uncontroversially 
within the sC0l'e of the Treaty Power, such as international trade 
or the internatIonal rendition of fugitives from prosecution by the 
United States. The negotiating partners might see this as an 
occasion for raising other issues. For example, they might take the 
position that they will agree to extradite those charged with federal 
money-laundering offenses only if the United States agrees to 
prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders charged in both federal 
and state courts.90 The U.S. treaty-makers-the President and the 
Senate-might agree to this proposal because they think the trade-off 
88. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 451-52 ("Today, almost any issue can 
plausibly be labelea "international."). Bradley continues, "[E]ven if there were 
a workable distinction in theory between international and domestic matters, it 
seems unlikely that u.s. courts would feel competent to contradict the political 
branches on this issue. It is far from clear, for example, what standard tne courts 
could use to draw such a line." Id. at 453. 
89. Goldsmith, supra note 13, at 1416. 
90. The national government clearly has the power to eliminate the juvenile 
death penalty in federal prosecutions, and has done so. 18 U.S.C. § 3591{a) 
(1994). In the unlikely event that a negotiating partner insisted only that the 
juvenile death penalty be eliminated in state prosecutions, the federal negotiators 
might be more willing to concede than if they themselves had to forgo executing 
juvenile offenders. We might develop a doctrine that treaty provisions must deal 
even-handedly with the state and national governments, although I am skeptical 
about the possibility of developing a useful standard for determining when a 
provision operates in an even-handed way, and more skeptical about the need for 
a doctrine to guard against what seems to me a quite remote possibility. 
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is worth it. Standing alone, the ban on the execution of juvenile 
offenders might not be a matter appropriate for international 
agreement, but the extradition issue clearly is.91 It is hard to 
understand why U.S. negotiators' hands should be tied when they 
see~ to ac~o~plish what all would concede are appropriate foreign-
polley obJectIves. 
The foregoing example suggests the difficulty with the other 
approach to subject-matter limItations, carving out enclaves where 
only the states may regulate. One can readily devise scenarios in 
whIch the treaty-maKers can accomplish concededly national 
objectives only by trading off some matters otherwise within the 
control of the states. For example, in the middle of a trade 
negotiation one of the trading partners says, "Well, we'll concede 
to you and allow the chstribution in our country of 
biotechnologically enhanced food products from the U.S., although 
our people are going to be pretty upset about that. To offset their 
concern, though, in exchange you've got to stop executing juvenile 
offenders anywhere in the United States." As Professor Weisburd 
puts it, the United States enters negotiations with other nations 
"because it wants something from die other party or parties to the 
treaty, not because it seeks to use the treaty as a mechanism for 
domestic regulation," but "[ d]omestic effects may be inevitable. "92 
It is implausible to impute to the Framers, or to any reasonable 
manner of constructing a national government, an interest in 
creating a structure tnat bars the national government from 
achieving national objectives in a manner that interferes with state 
prerogatIves, when compelled to do so bY' its negotiatin~ partners.93 
The preceding argument also responds to the Court s expressed 
concern that constitutional doctrine must not authorize Congress 
91. Mari Matsuda suggested in conversation that one could defend the 
position that the treaty power had no subject-matter limits even in the absence 
of explicit trade-offs. The U.S. treaty-makers could reasonably take the position 
that their bargaining position in a range of negotiations is strengthened by a 
perception among the negotiating partners that the United States is a law-abiding 
nation that honors internationalliuman rights norms. On this argument, even 
a free-standing treaty banning the death penalty for juvenile offenders would be 
a Eermissible exercise of the treaty power because adopting such a treaty would 
enhance the U.S. position in other negotiations about matters that 
unquestionably deal with matters of international concern. 
92. Weisburd, supra note 30, at 921. 
93. Again, the bi- or multilateral nature of foreign affairs distinguishes these 
negotiations from policy-making in a purely domestic context, where only 
Congress and the President decide what policies to fursue. In the treaty context, 
the U.S. treaty-makers initially decide on the nation s preferred policies, but they 
then must respond to counter-proposals by other nations. 
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to do whatever its members think is wise policy, without regard to 
the source of their power to do good things. The Court's concern 
arises from the perception that Congress may act on its own, to do 
what it wants. The treaty context comes close to eliminating the 
possibility of unilateral action by Congress or the treaty-makers: 
national law-makers cannot do whatever they want, but only what 
other nations require them to do in order to extract from those 
other nations an agreement to do something in the U.S. national 
interest. The bargaining context, that is, sets the limits on 
Con~ess's unilateral action that the Court has sought through 
constitutional doctrine in the purely domestic context. 
Professor Curtis Bradley has suggested one final subject-matter 
limitation. Under his proposal, Congress's power in international 
affairs, and in particular the treaty power, would not be an 
independent source of national authority.94 That is, no law could 
survive a federalism-based challenge unless its defenders could 
identify some source of congressional power other than the treaty 
power that is sufficient to authorize the statute. Professor Bradley's 
proposal is reminiscent of controversies in an earlier era over 
whether the Spending Clause was an independent source of national 
power, or wliether instead Congress could appropriate money to 
achieve objectives determined only: by some other enumerated 
power. The Supreme Court rejected tlie latter proposition,95 thus 
avoiding the problem that the alternative interpretation would have 
renderea the Spending Clause redundant. Redundancy is something 
of a problem In connection with Professor Bradley's proposal as 
well, because it would not authorize the national government to do 
an~hing domestically that it could not do anyw:ay.96 Professor 
Bradley points out, however, that his proposal would not make the 
Treaty Power completely redundant, because it would authorize 
the national government to enter into agreements that would bind 
it internationally. Any breaches would be subject to international 
sanction. Note, however, that Professor Bradley's proposal means 
that the United States simply cannot comply with some provisions 
in international agreements the Constitution allows it to make. It 
is only a slight exaggeration to say that, under his proposal, the 
nation woula be in Violation of its international obligations at the 
moment it entered the agreement. Again, it is difficult to 
understand why one would design a constitution having that shape. 
A requirement that international agreements deal with matters 
94. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 456. 
95. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). 
96. Of course the procedures for adopting treatIes and statutes differ. 
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truly appropriate for international agreement, or a rule that the 
Treaty Power was not an independent source of domestic 
authority, could act as a bar to what might be called sham treaties. 
Such treaties are ~reements Fned \lp by the U.S. trea~-makers 
simply to accomplish somethmg they could not accomplish under 
any other power.97 One must imagme U.S. officials approaching 
some foreign partner, saying, "Look, could you do us a favor? We 
want to do something, (for example, regulate land use, or eliminate 
the death penalty for juveniles) that the Supreme Court won't let 
us do on our own. But if you sign on to an agreement that obligates 
us to do it, then everythin~ would be hunky-dory under our 
Constitution." Perhaps there IS a reason to construct constitutional 
doctrine to guard ?gainst such a remote possibility.98 Doctrines, 
though, have a tendency to expand beyond their rationales, and the 
risk of doctrinal creep probably exceeds the risk that the United 
States would negotiate sham treaties, in which case it would be 
better not to create a doctrine whose sole function is to bar sham 
treaties.99 
In sum, it is quite hard to devise a reasonable subject-matter 
97. Professor Golove, while criticizing the view that there are subject-matter 
limits on the treaty power, agrees that sham treaties cannot be enforced 
domestically against feoeralism objections. See Golove, supra note 83, at 1287 
("[T]he l'urpose of a treaty cannot be to adopt domestic standards just because 
the Presldent and Senate oelieve them to be laudable."). See also HENKIN, supra 
note 87, at 143 ("A treaty ... must be a bonafide a$reement between states, not 
a 'mock marriage', nor a unilateral act by the Umted States to which a foreign 
government lenas itself as an accommodation .... "). 
98. A somewhat more realistic possibility is a treaty whose domestic 
implications are strongly favored by the U.S. nego~iators even though those 
implications are otherwise beyond the national government's power. The 
negotiators might then make larger concessions to the negotiating partners. A 
doctrine responsive to this concern would have to allow U.S. negotiators to 
agree to such provisions if they extracted "enough" in exchange, and pretty 
clearly would not be an attractive one for courts to administer. 
99. I note another difficulty with the concern for sham treaties. Why would 
the negotiating partner simply 00 the U.S. treaty-makers a favor? They mi&ht see 
the U.S. offer as an opportunity to extract something in exchange. And, If that 
something is an appropriate subject for international agreement, such as a trade 
concession, we woUld again be in the position of having an agreement part of 
which is within the nation's power and part of which is (by hypothesis) not. As 
argued above, such mixed agreements would almost certainly survive 
constitutional scrutiny. For completeness, I note the possibility of a doctrine 
condemning treaties as shams where the international coml'0nent in a mixed 
agreement was simply a facade for the treaty's true goal. Agam, the possibilities 
that the treaty-makers would enter such agreements, and that the courts would 
be able reliably to identify them, are so small that developing a doctrine along 
these lines seems inadvisable. 
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limitation on Congress's power in the international domain. Even 
in the new constitutional order, an agreement to eliminate the 
juvenile death penalty should be upheld. loo The United States is 
unlikely to enter into such an agreement. 
2. The Anti-Commandeering Principle 
There is an obvious objection to the main argument in the 
preceding section. Suppose the negotiating partners demanded that 
the u.S. government enact, not a law impermissible for federalism 
reasons, but a law violating the First Amendment.IOI The New 
Deal-Great Society order accepted the proposition that the forei~ 
affairs ~ower was limited by the Constitution's protections of 
libe~. 02 But, ifthe United States can override federalism concerns 
to achieve its foreign policy goals, why can it not override the Bill 
of Rights for the same reason? 
One answer may simply be that the New Deal-Great Society 
constitutional order accepted a shary distinction between individual 
liberties, enumerated in the Constitution, and what Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes called the "invisible radiation" of the Tenth 
~men~eI}t.103 Another ~swer may be that the T~eaty Pow:e~ is 
mdeed hffilted by federalism concerns, conceptualized' as ansmg 
independent of the substantive scope of the Treaty Power.l04 The 
issue then becomes one of identifYing an appropriate federalism 
doctrine limiting, not just the Treao/ Power, but all enumerated 
powers. At present the only: candidate for such a doctrine is the 
anti-commandeering principle. , 
The Vienna Convention's reguirement that police officials 
advise forei~ nationals of their riglits under the Convention seems 
a strai~ht-forward example of commandeering pursuant to a 
treaty. 5 Other treaties ffilght direct state officials to comply with 
100. Should here is both predictive and normative. 
101. For example, a law bringing the United States in line with the 
international consensus that hate speecn should be illegal could possibly violate 
the First Amendment (to the extent that such hate speech laws are 
unconstitutional). 
102. See HENKIN, suprfl note 87, at 254-66 (describing the liberty-based 
limitations on the foreign affairs power). 
103. See Missouri v. Holland; 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920). 
104. One formulation is that subject-matter limitations identify internal 
limits on each enumerated power, limits that are specific to each such power, 
while individual-rights limitations are external to all the enumerated powers and 
cut across them all. 
105. See Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1339 (describing the Convention's 
requirements as commandeering); Healy, supra note 86, at 1746 (same). 
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international human rights norms in ways requiring that they act 
rather than refrain from acting.l06 Similarly, treaties might require 
that effective remedies be provided for violations of human rights. 
Creating such remedies might require legislation.l07 Do these 
possibilIties raise constitutional questions? 
The Court's anti-commandeering decisions describe a quite 
limited exception that might be applicable to the Vienna 
Convention problem, though not to the others. The exception, 
described by Justice O'Connor and not disclaimed by the Court, 
would allow Congress to require state officials to compile 
information and report that information to federal officials. lOS The 
decisions do not provide a justification for this exception.109 The 
Court asserted tnat it lacked the capacity to determine whether 
congressional requirements were too burdensome,l1o so it cannot be 
that information-compilation does not impose real burdens on state 
officials. The most prominent functional reason the Court offered 
106. I believe that there is an anal~ic problem lurking in the Court's 
apparent distinction between im,permissible affirmative commandeering and 
permissible negative commandeenngthrough preemption of state authority. For 
a discussion, see Tushnet, supra note 22, at 27. For present purposes, however, 
I accept the proposition that affirmative commandeering is impermissible but 
preemption IS acceptable. But note Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1347-48, 1350, uses 
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1923), which upheld a treaty provision (from the 
Treaty on Commerce and NaVIgation, Feb. 21, 1911, U.S.-Japan, 37 Stat. 1504), 
that effectively required the city to consider license applicatlOns from Japanese 
citizens, to illustrate the proposition that "it is notoriously difficult to draw the 
line between affirmative and negative obligations." 
107. Accordin~ to the Supreme Court, the anti-commandeering principle 
would not be implicated if the treaties required only that state courts -prOVIde 
enhanced remedies within a general remedial framework already created by state 
law. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 1778-79 (1992) (distin~hing 
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), on the ground that the Supremacy Clause, 
directed specifically at state judges, allows them to be "commandeered" to 
enforce national law). 
108. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936 (1997) (O'Connor, J., 
concurring) (noting that the Court "refrains from decicfuig whether •.. purely 
ministerial" reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and locil 
authorities pursuant to Its Commerce Clause powers are . . . invalid," and 
referring to a federal law requiring reporting missmg children to the Department 
of Justice). 
109. The Court's analysis is expressly formalist, meaning in this context that 
the Court does not provide functional justifications for l~e parts of its doctrine. 
The information-compilation exception might be a formalist exception to a 
formalist doctrine, in which case there is little to say about it. See also Tushnet, 
supra note 22, at 30-32 (describing the Court's formalism and the way in which 
it limits the possibilities of reasoned analysis of the doctrine's contours and 
implications). 
110. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33. 
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for the anti-commandeering doctrine is that commandeering 
diffuses political responsibility by making it unclear to citizens 
whether they should complain to local officials or to their 
representatives in Congress about some action they dislike.Ill 
Commentators have questioned the cogency of this ~ment, 112 
but perhaps it explains why Congress may require state officials to 
compile iiiformation. The Court migJIt believe that few citizens are 
likely to complain about state officials' efforts to obtain the 
information Congress requires, or that Congress has asked state 
officials merely to assemble in a form Congress requires 
information they already have obtained for their own purposes. I 
have my doubts about these factual propositions, but something 
like them must underlie a functional explanation of the exception 
to the anti-commandeering doctrine. 
Perhaps Congress ml~ht reguire notification as well as 
information-compilation.ll Notification is, in one sense, simply 
information-compilation in reverse: Instead of asking someone for 
information, the police officials provide information to that person. 
And yet, the Court's functional concerns seem to come into play 
here. Providing the required information might be burdensome, 
particularly wilen the police officials must locate a consular official 
who might be far away.1l4 Obviously the person receiving the 
information is unlikely to complain. But what about the victims 
and their families? Notifying a criminal suspect of his or her rights 
is controversial when the notification is required by the Court's 
interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, because, critics think, it 
interferes with the ability of the _government effectively to enforce 
the criminal law . Might not notification required by a treaty be at 
least as controversial? Describing the problem after a failure to 
notify has occurred, one commentator observes that executive 
offiCials face "a difficult decision ... -whether to adhere to an 
international obligation that most of their constituents probably 
111. See New York, 505 U.S. at 182-83. 
112. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May 
Congress Commandeer State O~ers to Implement Fidei-al Law?, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1001, 1068-74 (1995); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy 0/ 
Cooperative Federalism: Why StateAutonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" 
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 824-31 (1998); Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and 
the Uses and Limits o/Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2200-
05 (1998). 
113. Of course an exception for notification could be an additional formalist 
exception to a formalist doctrine. 
114. See Thornberry, supra note 86, at 134-35 (describing the burdens 
notification might impose). 
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did not know of or understand, or whether to adhere to their 
states' criminal justice concerns .... "115 The public might well 
project the same conflict back to the time when notification is 
actually given. The ar~ment from diffusion of political 
responsibility in controversial settinfis seems no less powelful here 
than in the cases the Court decided. 6 
Perhaps one might conceptualize a notification requirement 
somewhat differently. As noted earlier, the Court's anti-
commandeering doctrine applies to efforts by Congress to 
commandeer state legislative and executive officials, but die Court 
allows Congress to commandeer state judicial officers. The doctrine 
thus i~licates the separation of powers on the state level. Modern 
separatlon-of-powers aoctrine has two competing_strands.117 In one, 
the three branches are sharply separated. According to this strand, 
a notification requirement would clearly be imposed on state 
executive officials, and would be subject to the anti-commandeering 
requirement. In the other strandg however, the lines are blurred, largely for functional reasons. ll This strand might support an 
argument locatin~ the notification requirement somewhere on the 
edges of the judiCial branch because notification is closely bound up 
with criminal prosecutions heard by the courtS.119 
Once again history might justify some degree of 
commandeenng pursuant to tlie Treaty Power. According to 
Professor A. Mark Weisburd, "early treaties included topics that 
apparently required action by local executive officials.,,120 One 
115.Id. at 126-27. Thornberry notes that of course governors will take the 
latter course, quoting then-Governor George W. Bush: "In general, I will uphold 
the laws of the State of Texas, regardless of the nationality of the person 
involved." [d. 
116. I do not mean to claim that the argument is powerful or persuasive in 
its original context, but only that it is no less powerful or persuasive in the 
present one. 
117. The classic discussion is Peter Strauss, Formal andFunctionalApproaches 
to Separation o/Powers Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 
488 (1987). 
118. See Strauss, supra note 117. 
119. Thornberry, supra note 86, at 142, suggests that the anti-
commandeering principle would be avoided in the Breard context by: requiring 
a determination at every defendant's initial [judicial] hearing" of whetlier the 
defendant is a foreign national, and requiring notification of forei~ nationals' 
rights at that time; see also Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1326 n.30 (maKing the same 
suggestion). 
120. Weisburd, supra note 30, at 903. Professor Weisburd's prime example 
is a convention concluded in 1788 (Im.rlementing a treaty made in 1778) 
requiring a party's "officials competent to arrest deserters from the other 
nation's merchant ships. As Professor Weisburd points out, one might 
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might read the Court's anti-commandeering decisions to mean that 
commandeering that lacks a decent historical pedigree is 
impermissible, leaving open the possibility that long-established 
forms of commandeering, such as consular notification, are 
constitutionally permissible. 
The Court has offered another, substantially more expansive 
way of working around the anti-commandeering principle.12l The 
analysis is deceptively simple. Assume that Congress may preempt 
state action, dlrecting the states to do nothing about a particular 
problem. Then, according to the Court, Congress can restore 
authority to the states on condition that they enact l~gislation 
Con~ess wants or on condition that their executive officers do 
something that Congress wants. 
Professor Carlos Vazquez defends the Vienna Convention's 
requirements by invoking the conditional preemQtion doctrine.122 
According to hun, the Convention says to state officials, "of course 
you don't have to arrest foreign nationals, but if you do, you have 
to notify them of their rights under the Convention. ,,123 Professor 
Vazquez's argument is entirely compatible with the Coun's 
articulated doctrine, but it has the effect of trivializing the anti-
mistakenly think that the relevant "officials competent" would be officials of the 
national government. But there were no such officials in 1788; the Constitution 
had been completed but the national government was not yet organized. See id. 
Professor Welsburd acknowledges die possibility that a duty imposed on state 
officials in 1788 was transferred to federal officials when the national. government 
was organized, but argues that doing so "would have required the establishment 
of a substantial federal eo lice force in a good many port cities," a requirement 
that he correctly thinks Implausible to attribute to the Framers. [d. at 903 n.142. 
121. See James A. Deeken, Note, A New Miranda for Foreign Nationals? The 
Impact o/Federalism on International Treaties that Place Affirmative Obligations 
on State Governments in the Wake of Printz v. Unitec{'States, 31 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'LL. 997, 1030 (1998) (arguing that a state's failure to notify foreign 
nationals of their rights under the Vienna Convention might be said to interfere 
with the purposes of the Convention). If this is a valid argument, then the 
Convention would preempt something, but it is not entir~!y clear what: maybe 
the state's prosecution or state rules immunizing police officers frem monetary 
liabilitr for unlawful action. Deeken argues that the Convention itself does not 
establiSh a rule requiring the exclusion of evidence acquired as a result of a failure 
to comply with the Convention's notification requirement. [d. at 1036-38. 
122. See Vazquez, supra note 74. 
123. Id. at 1325. Tlie national government's power to deny state officials 
authority to arrest or prosecute foreign nationals arises from its power over 
foreign relations. Other nations might trust the u.s. government out not sub-
national governments, and might insist in negotiatIOns that only the U.S. 
government prosecute their nationals, even for ordinary crimes. That possibility 
IS sufficient to establish that the u.s. government has the power to preempt the 
application of state criminal laws to foreign nationals. 
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commandeering rule. As Professor Vazquez points out, the statutes 
the Court invahdated as commandeering state officials could readily 
be re-cast-and even merely re-interpreted-as conditionally 
preempting state law.124 A broadly construed doctrine authorizing 
commandeering by means of conditional ~reemption would make 
the anti-commandeering principle one truly of form alone. 
That said, the power to commandeer through conditional 
preemption would seem expansive enough to encompass virtually 
any imaginable international agreement that would effectively 
require states to comply with international human rights norms. 
Consider again the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Recall that 
I have argued that it is nearly impossible to devise a doctrine that 
would take some subject matter off the table for international 
negotiation. H that argument is right, there can be no subject-matter 
limitation barring the national government from regulating 
ordinary crime. Pursuant to a treaty, then, Congress could enact a 
statute making every capital crime committed by a juvenile in states 
with the juvenile death penalty exclusively a federal offense, 
punishable by something other than death. With the power to 
preempt, Congress can then exercise the conditional-preemption 
power and authorize states to prosecute juvenile offenders but only 
on condition that they not be subject to capital punishment.125 
Perhaps the intuitIon behind the anti-commandeering principle 
can be salvaged by transforming the Court's concern with the 
diffusion of political responsibility. As Professor Weisburd puts it, 
the early treaties «do not purport to brinij about Jundtimental 
changes in state governmental structures." 26 As noted above, 
Congress's self-serving purposes and impulse to aggrandize its 
power at the expense of the states might be constrained at least a bit 
m the treaty context. This is because the other nations with whom 
the treaty-makers deal may have no interest in helping Congress 
become more powerful. In this context, then, a rule more limited 
than the anti-commandeering one might be defensible: the treaty-
makers cannot enter into agreements that would fundamentally 
124. See Vazquez, supra note 74, at 1327-28 (suggestin~ a rewriting of the 
Brady Act to invoke the power to preempt on condition); see also Janet R. 
Carter, Note, Commandeering Undei- the Treaty Power, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 598, 
618 (2001) (arguing that "finding such proposals to be within Con~ress's powers 
would open the door to complete circumvention of states' rights ). 
125. This example is a oit off-key, because barring states from executing 
juvenile offenders is not precisely a form of affirmative commandeering. A better 
example may be a requirement that states that prosecute juvenile offenders 
confme them in prisons for a federally prescribed number of years. 
126. See Weisburd, supra note 30, at 918 (emphasis added); see also HENKIN, 
supra note 87, at 148 (describing a similar constraint). 
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change state governments. 
But, once again, we might wonder about the need for such a 
doctrine in the modem era. The treaty-makers are hardly likely to 
accede to requests from other nations that would have die effect of 
wreaking such fundamental changes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the contours of federalism doctrines limiting 
U.S. national power in the international arena are difficult to 
define, and in any event address purely hYJ:?othetical problems that 
are unlikely to be real matters of policy-making concern in the new 
constitutional order. However, were the Court to announce a 
limiting doctrine, it might change the domestic playing field. It 
would present proponents of incorporating internationaI human 
rights norms into U.S. domestic law with another argument, 
beyond the existing, essentially: policy-based ones, that they would 
have to overcome. To do so, tney might well have to make some 
concessions of their own, leading to the adoption of a treaty in a 
different form from the one that would have been adopted were it 
clear that the treao/-makers had plenary power. Resolving the 
controversy over the existence of federalism limits on the treaty 
power thus has consequences even in the new constitutional era. 
The United States is unlikely to adopt the most expansive 
international human rights proposals currently: on the international 
agenda. It mig~t, however, agree to some modest proposals. Were 
tEe treaty-making community: (academics, members of Congress, 
executive branch officials, and Judges) to accept the proposition 
that there are federalism limits on the treaty power, whatever the 
United States adopts will be even more limited. 
Weare in the early days of the new constitutional order. I have 
argued that we can expect few bold initiatives from either the 
treaty-makers or the courts in this new order. The Supreme Court 
has articulated doctrines that might be developed m ways that 
would work large changes in what the past generation assumed the 
treaty-makers could do. We should expect, though, that the 
doctrines will not be developed in such ways. Nor should we ex,pect 
that the need will arise for the courts to invoke doctrines linuting 
national power in the name of federalism.127 
127. In one sense this observation echoes Professor Thomas Franck's 
pessimism about the incorporation of international norms into U.S. law and 
policy, and offers some structural and political considerations supporting his 
normative concerns. Thomas M. Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A 
Pessimistic Comment on Harold Koh's Optimism, 35 Hous. L. REv. 683 (1998). 
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